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Investment is one of the most influential factors for explaining macroeconomic booms 
and slumps because of its volatile nature. However the models derived from 
neoclassical theory have not performed well when compared with ad hoc accelerator 
models of investment (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1988). 
There are at least five reasons for the poor empirical performance of neoclassical 
models. First, firms might face the financial constraints, which neoclassical theory 
ignores. According to neoclassical theory, Tobin’s q is a sufficient statistic for the 
investment ratio. However, many empirical studies have found the cash flow variable 
has a statistically significant effect on investment. Firms facing financial constraints 
may be unable to invest even if they wish to. Fazzari et.al (1998), having divided their 
sample into groups of firms with high and low dividends, find that severely financially 
constrained firms react more sensitively to cash flow. They also demonstrate that firms 
are not indifferent between using internal and external funds for investment. Having 
divided their sample into firms with main banks and those without, Hoshi et al. (1991) 
estimate separate investment equations for these groups. Having found that the 
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estimated coefficient of the cash flow variable is significantly smaller for firms with 
main banks, Hoshi et al. (1991) argue that main banks mitigate the asymmetric 
information problem and reduce the agency cost of lending. From this viewpoint, cash 
flow is an important component of internal funds, and the agency cost of internal funds 
is lower than that of external funds. Thus, the investment behaviour of firms is 
sensitive to the volume of internal funds. 
Second, the fundamentals that drive investment might be mismeasured. In particular, 
most studies use average q as a measure of fundamentals. Average q in turn is defined 
as the ratio of the firm’s intrinsic value to the replacement cost of its assets. Because 
the firm’s intrinsic value is unobservable, most authors have used its market value as 
a proxy. However, people might make mistakes in evaluating the firm’s intrinsic value 
and/or may speculate on the stock market. Thus, the stock market value may be 
misleading, and might be a poor proxy for the intrinsic value. Instead of using stock 
market values, Cummins et al. (2006) propose using analysts’ forecasts to measure 
average q. 
Third, in practice, fixed investment is often infrequent and lumpy. Among others, Abel 
and Eberly (1994, 2002) formalise this idea in constructing neoclassical non-linear 
investment functions. The derived investment functions incorporate an inactive region 
in which investment does not respond to Tobin’s q. In these models, the adjustment 
costs of investment incorporate not only standard convex costs, but also lumpy fixed 
costs and/or those related to the irreversibility of investment. Some authors assert that 
adjustment costs are asymmetric because firms might incur additional costs above a 
certain threshold (e.g., when their investments exceed replacement investment). The 
asymmetric adjustment costs with a certain threshold could also produce an inactive 
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region in the investment function. 
Fourth, some researchers argue that because the lumpy nature of investment 
originates at the plant level, aggregation over plants distorts the shape of the 
investment function. To understand the relationship between adjustment costs and the 
non-linearity in investment, among others, Caballero et al. (1995, 1997), Goolsbee and 
Gross (2000) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) use plant-level data. 
Fifth, Cooper and Ejarque (2001) argue that allowing the profit function at the firm 
level to be strictly concave to reflect its market power is sufficient to replicate 
regression results based on q-theory when profits significantly affect investment. 
Empirical findings largely support the non-linear investment function instead of the 
linear one, but there is no consensus on the shape of the non-linearity. For example, 
the investment theory of Abel and Eberly (1994) suggests the non-linear investment 
function illustrated in Figure 1. The investment function in Figure 1 incorporates a 
part in which investment is insensitive to Tobin’s q. However Barnett and Sakellaris 
(1998) suggest a different shape based on their empirical work. Making use of grid 
methods, they suggest that the investment ratio is a convex function of average q for 
small values of q, and is a concave function for larger values of q. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide estimates of a non-linear investment function, taking into account 
the five problems mentioned above. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Our empirical findings indicate that the firm’s investment function is non-linear and 
has three parts and two thresholds. According to our estimated investment function, 
investment is insensitive to Tobin’s q for small values of q, is sensitive above the first 
threshold value of q, and is relatively insensitive above the second threshold value of q. 
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Although we used piecewise linear functions, incorporating the assumption of 
smoothness gives the estimated function a sigmoidal shape. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, we explain the relationship between 
various kinds of adjustment costs and the corresponding types of non-linearity in 
investment functions. In Section 2, we describe our approach to estimation. In Section 
3, we explain how to estimate a piecewise linear model with two thresholds, choose the 
best model among these models with two thresholds and compare this model with 
linear models and non-linear models that have one threshold. In Section 4, we report 
our empirical results and compare them with those from other studies. In Section 5, we 
discuss the implications of our findings and directions future research. 
 
1. Adjustment Costs and Types of Non-linear Investment Functions 
In this section, we review the relationship between adjustment costs and the type of 
non-linearity in investment functions. 
1.1. Standard Convex Adjustment Costs 
The standard neoclassical investment literature assumes convex adjustment costs. 
The simplest form is represented by the quadratic adjustment cost function. In this 
case, one can derive the investment ratio as a linear function of Tobin’s q (as shown in 
Appendix 1). 
1.2. The Irreversibility of Investment in Abel and Eberly (1994) 
Arrow (1968) argued that gross investment cannot take a negative value because of 
large disposal costs. Instead of following Arrow (1968) in assuming that the 
adjustment cost becomes infinite, Abel and Eberly (1994) quantify the irreversibility of 
investment as the difference between the purchase price ( +itp ) and the resale price ( −itp ) 
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of investment goods at time t, assuming that −+ > itit pp . The subscript i denotes the price 
of investment goods. 
Following Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), we briefly explain how incorporating this 
type of investment irreversibility into the adjustment cost generates an investment 
function that has an inactive component. 
The augmented adjustment cost function ( )1tt K,IG −  takes the form of  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0I0IDIp0IDIpK,ICK,IG tttitttit1tt1tt ≠<+>+= −+−−   if    , 
( ) 0IK,IC t1tt == −   if                                                ,                  (1-1) 
where tI , ( )1tt K,IC −  and D denote gross investment, the standard convex adjustment 
cost function, and an indicator function, respectively. The indicator function D takes a 
value of unity when the condition in parentheses is satisfied and is zero otherwise. 
Note that the augmented adjustment cost G is discontinuous at the value of 0It = . 
The first-order condition for investment is given by: 
( ) 0Ip/qI/K,IGp/p tttt1tttit ≠=∂∂+ − for      ,                      (1-2) 
where tp  and tq  denote the output price and the shadow price of capital at time t, 
respectively (see Appendix 1 for details). Denoting the right-hand neighbourhood and 
the left-hand neighbourhood of zero by +0  and −0 , respectively, we have: 
               ( ) +−++ ==∂∂+ 0Ip/qI/K,0Cp/p tttt1ttit    at   , 
and 
               ( ) −−−− ==∂∂+ 0Ip/qI/K,0Cp/p tttt1ttit    at   .                      (1-3) 
Dividing (1-3) by tit p/p+  throughout yields 
               ( ) ++++ ==+ 0Ip/qp/p/C1 titttitI    at    , 
and 
               ( ) −++−+− ==+ 0Ip/qp/p/Cp/p titttitIitit    at   ,                         (1-4) 
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where ( ) t1tI I/K,0CC ∂∂= −++  and ( ) t1tI I/K,0CC ∂∂= −−− , respectively. Equations (1-4) 
show that investment is a discontinuous function of q; this is illustrated in Figure 1. 
1.3. Linear Adjustment Cost in Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) 
Instead of assuming that the purchase price exceeds the resale price of investment 
goods, Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) postulate that the firm incurs an incremental 
linear adjustment cost θ  when its investment exceeds replacement investment. They 
assume an asymmetric adjustment cost, 
          ( ) ( ) ( ) δ≦K/IK,ICK,IG 1tt1tt1tt −−− =   if                          
                   ( ) ( ) ( ) δK/IKδIθK,IC 1tt1tt1tt >−+= −−−   if    .                 (1-5) 
The investment function based on the augmented adjustment cost (1-5) is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Under this assumption, investment is inactive at the value of the investment 
ratio δK/I 1tt =−  in Figure 2. 
1.4. An Alternative Specification of Irreversibility 
Alternatively, taking into account the irreversibility of investment, one could specify 
the augmented adjustment cost as: 
     ( ) ( ) δ≦K/IKδ
K
I
2
αK,IG 1tt1t
2
1t
t1
1tt −−
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=   if                                
( ) ( ) δK/IKδθKδ
K
I
2
α
1tt1t1t
2
1t
t2 >−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= −−−
−
  if         It ,            (1-6) 
where 0αα 21 >> . The augmented adjustment cost is composed of two quadratic 
functions. It is asymmetric and thus not differentiable at ( ) δK/I 1tt =− . Equation (1-6) 
is illustrated in Figure 3.  
[Figure 3 around here] 
As in Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), equation (1-6) includes the incremental linear cost 
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( )1tt KδIθ −− , which implies that the firm incurs an additional linear cost as well as the 
standard convex cost when its investment exceeds replacement investment. However, 
given the assumption that 0αα 21 >> , the firm also incurs increasingly large costs 
when making negative net investments (when 0KδI 1tt <− − ) because of the 
irreversibility of investment. As argued by Arrow (1968), the firm incurs prohibitive 
costs as 1α  goes to infinity with the value of 2α  held constant. 
The specification of the augmented adjustment cost in (1-6) together with the 
first-order condition for investment (1-2) yields the non-linear investment function 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
The slope of the third part of the non-linear investment function in Figure 4 is much 
steeper than that of the first part. This is because the slopes of the first and third parts 
of the investment function in Figure 4 depend on ( α/1 ) (see Appendix 1), and because  
of the assumption that 0αα 21 >> . The larger the value of α , the less steep is the 
slope of the investment function in Figure 4. Indeed, as 1α  tends to infinity, the slope 
of the first part approaches the horizontal line at the height of δ , and the investment 
function looks like the one illustrated in Figure 5. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
1.5. Potentially Prohibitive Adjustment Costs for Extremely Large Investments 
The assumption of standard convex adjustment costs implies that the second 
derivative of the adjustment cost function is positive. There are usually two reasons for 
this. First, as the firm expands its investment, the costs of retraining labour, and 
management and other associated costs become increasingly high. Second, investment 
goods prices might rise as the firm purchases more investment goods. 
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In this sub-section, we postulate that the cost becomes prohibitive as the firm’s 
investment ratio exceeds a certain threshold. We believe that there is some limitation 
to expanding investment, partly because, as the firm significantly expands its 
investment, management cannot consider an infinite number of investment projects at 
the same time and partly because supply shortages of investment goods eventually 
make investment goods prices prohibitively high. 
Suppose that the augmented adjustment cost is given by: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )                  
   if            I                 
   if                                   
t
1t
2
3
2
1t
t3
3
1tt1t1t
2
1t
t2
2
1tt1t
2
1t
t1
11tt
Kδλ
α
α
λ
K
I
2
α
G
λ≦K/IδKδθKδ
K
I
2
αG
δ≦K/IKδ
K
I
2
αGK,IG
−
−
−−−
−
−−
−
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−==
<−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −==
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −==
  
               ( ) ( ) ( ) λK/IKδλ
α
α1
2
αKδθ 1tt1t
2
3
22
1t >−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+ −−−    if     It ,         (1-7) 
where 3α  and λ  are positive constant parameters such that 23 αα >  and δλ > . The 
augmented adjustment cost function (1-7) is illustrated in Figure 6. 
[Figure 6 around here] 
The augmented adjustment cost function in (1-7), together with the first-order 
condition for investment (1-2) and the assumption of 1α  being infinite, yields the 
non-linear investment function illustrated in Figure 7. 
[Figure 7 around here] 
The non-linear investment function now has two kinks. Above the first threshold, the 
firm increases its investment ratio dramatically, as q increases. However, there is some 
saturation point for the investment ratio, λ , beyond which the investment ratio 
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increases only moderately as q increases. The investment function in Figure 7 is 
S-shaped or ‘sigmoidal’. If we assume a ‘smooth’ investment function, then a logistic 
curve would be a good approximation. 
Empirical studies such as those of Eberly (1997) and Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) 
suggest this shape. Abel and Eberly (2002) argue that aggregation over heterogeneous 
capital goods might yield an S-shaped investment function. To choose between a linear 
model, a logistic model and a hybrid of the two, Honda and Suzuki (2000) use the 
Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwartz Information Criterion. They also 
suggest that their investment function takes the logistic form for a sample of large 
Japanese manufacturers. 
 
2. The Basic Model  
Taking into account the relationship between adjustment costs and the type of 
non-linearity of investment functions, and following Tachibana’s (2007) analysis of 
piecewise linear models, we estimate a piecewise linear investment function for the 
i th firm, 
    11tt1t21t11t1110
1t
t q≦qDLγLγqββ
K
I
−−−−
−
⋅+++=   if      
21tt1t21t11t
2
1
2
0 q≦qDLγLγqββ −−−− <⋅+++= 1q  if     
21tt1t21t11t
3
1
3
0 qqDLγLγqββ >⋅+++= −−−−   if   ,                           (2-1) 
where 1tL −  and tD  denote the log of total fixed assets, and a dummy variable that is 
unity if the i th firm has never issued corporate bonds and zero otherwise, respectively. 
The parameters β  and γ  are to be estimated. The first and second threshold values 
of Tobin’s q are denoted by 1q  and 2q , respectively, and tq  denotes Tobin’s q at time t. 
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To avoid simultaneity bias, we use one-period lagged values for tq  in equation (2-1). 
Hansen (1999), Chida (2003), and Bo et al. (2006) carefully analyse threshold 
regression models. However, none of them uses Tobin’s q as a right-hand-side threshold 
variable, and their focus differs from ours. Because we are interested in testing the 
validity of Tobin’s q theory, the right-hand-side threshold variable should be Tobin’s q. 
We have explicitly clarified the relationship between the types of adjustment costs and 
the shape of non-linearity of the investment function in the previous section to extend 
Tobin’s q theory in such a way that the investment function has an inactive part. 
2.1. Financial Constraints 
Based on a similar sample to ours, Honda and Suzuki (2006) find that financial 
constraints significantly affect the investment ratio. To incorporate financial 
constraints, equation (2-1) includes the terms 1tL −  and t1t DL ⋅−  as right-hand-side 
variables. When a firm has a large amount of capital stock at time 1t − , 1tL −  becomes 
large. Given a sufficient stock of capital, such a firm is expected to make less 
investment at time t. Hence, the expected sign of 1γ  is negative. On the other hand, 
we expect 2γ  to be positive. Firms often use fixed capital as collateral when they 
borrow money, and fixed capital is a rough indicator of ‘creditworthiness’, which is 
particularly important for smaller firms that have never issued corporate bonds. The 
larger the value of collateral, the less likely is the financial constraint to be binding, 
and thus the larger is the investment ratio. Note that we include the interaction 
dummy t1t DL ⋅−  rather than the simple dummy variable tD  in equation (2-1). This is 
because including the simple dummy variable tD  together with individual dummy 
variables in a panel data regression causes perfect multi-collinearity. 
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Among others, Abel and Eberly (1994, 2002), Eberly (1997) and Barnett and Sakellaris 
(1998) exclude financial constraints from their non-linear estimated equations. 
However, Fazzari et al. (1998), Hoshi et al. (1991) and Honda and Suzuki (2006), 
among others, argue that financial constraints are important determinants of 
investment ratios. Thus, omitting these financial constraint variables from the 
non-linear regressions might seriously bias the estimates. Thus, we include tL  and 
tt DL ⋅  on the right-hand side of equation (2-1). 
2.2. Sample Selection 
We use data on unlisted Japanese auto parts suppliers for a number of reasons. First, 
data on listed large corporations might distort the true investment behaviour of firms 
because large corporations tend to produce multiple products in different fields. When 
there are multiple products, the relationship between the investment ratio and Tobin’s 
q is less clear. 
At the other extreme, some authors use plant-level data. Doms and Dunne (1998) find 
that most fixed investments are infrequent but lumpy at the plant level. Incorporating 
the finding of Doms and Dunne (1998), Caballero et al. (1995) develop a model in which 
fixed investments are not made gradually but are undertaken only when the difference 
between the desired and the existing capital stock exceeds a certain threshold. 
We do not use plant-level data because it is difficult to measure Tobin’s q at the plant 
level. In addition, firms examine all potential projects when making decisions on fixed 
investments. They do not investment in one plant without considering the situations in 
other plants. 
There is another advantage using data on unlisted Japanese auto parts suppliers. 
Cooper and Ejarque (2003), among others, point out that the q-theory of investment 
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does not apply to firms that have market power. Unlisted Japanese auto parts 
suppliers supply auto parts to giant auto manufacturers such as Toyota, and are less 
likely to have market power. Thus, sampling unlisted smaller firms that have limited 
market power is appropriate for our purposes. 
2.3. Data on Tobin’s q 
Because we use data on unlisted firms, stock price data are not available. Therefore, 
we have constructed our measure of Tobin’s q based on the balance sheet and the profit 
and loss account of each firm. (See Appendix 2 for details.) 
 
3. Piecewise Linear Models 
As was explained in Section 1, the investment theory on Tobin’s q suggests that there 
are at most two thresholds in a piecewise linear model. We first explain how we 
estimate a piecewise linear model with two thresholds, and then discuss the procedure 
for choosing between models that contain zero, one, or two thresholds. 
3.1. Estimation of a Model with Two Thresholds 
In this sub-section, we explain how to estimate a piecewise linear model with two 
thresholds. Rewriting equation (2-1) as an econometric model yields: 
               ( ) ( )11it1it1110it q≦qIqββy −−+=     
                  ( ) ( )21it11it2120 q≦qqIqββ −− <++     
                  ( ) ( )21it1it3130 qqIqββ >++ −−     
                  itiit1it21it1 uWφDLγLγ ++⋅++ −− ,                            (3-1) 
where we define 1ititit K/Iy −= . Subscript i  denotes the i th firm. I( ⋅ ) and itu  denote 
the indicator function and the disturbance term, respectively. iW  denotes the 
individual dummy variable, which is unity for the i th firm and zero otherwise, and φ  
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is the corresponding coefficient parameter. The disturbance terms are assumed to be 
independently and normally distributed. Given the values of 1itL − , itD , iW , and itu , 
equation (3-1) is illustrated in Figure 8. Our estimation method is based on grid 
methods. We first provide a combination of respective numbers for the values of 1q  
and 2q , and then estimate equation (3-1) by using the fixed-effects model. 
[Figure 8 around here] 
To estimate equation (3-1), given the values of 1q  and 2q , we transform equation 
(3-1). The conditions for our piecewise linear model to be continuous at the respective 
points 1q  and 2q  are given by: 
                   1212011110 qββqββ +=+    
and 
                   2313022120 qββqββ +=+ .                                      (3-2) 
Solving for 10β  and 20β  in equation (3-2), expressing these two parameters in terms of 
3
0β , 11β , 21β , and 31β  and then substituting the resulting equations into equation (3-1) 
yields: 
   itit1it21it1it31it21it1130it uDLγLγMβJβGββy +⋅+++++= −− , 
where 
 ( ) ( )11it11itit q≦qIqqG −− −= , 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21-it121it11it21it qq≦qIqqq≦qIqqJ <−+−= −− , 
and 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]21-it111it221-it111it1itit q≦qqIq≦qIqq≦qqIq≦qI1qM <++<−−= −−− .       (3-3) 
One can estimate equation (3-3) using standard computer software. 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel. There are 1,553 observations on 104 firms for the 
sample period from 1977 to 2006. However, after excluding outliers, our final number 
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of observations is 1,527. (See A2-1 in Appendix 2.) Table 1 provides summary statistics 
for our sample of 1,527 observations. Figure 9 plots these observations with the 
investment ratio on the vertical axis and the lagged Tobin’s q on the horizontal axis. 
This shows that the ratio of investment to capital stock jumps upward near the value 
of one of the lagged Tobin’s q values. 
[Table 1 around here] 
[Figure 9 around here] 
3.2. The Best Model with Two Thresholds 
We first choose the best model among those models with two thresholds. Our procedure 
comprises two steps. First, we select our benchmark model by using ‘likelihood’ as our 
criterion. Then, in the second step, we compare this benchmark model with all other 
models, and choose the best model by using as our criterion the ‘encompassing 
principle’ (based on non-nested J-tests). 
3.2.1. Likelihood 
We first provide a combination of respective numbers for the values of 1q  and 2q , 
and estimate equation (3-3). Similarly, we repeat the same procedure for all 
combinations of the respective values of 1q  and 2q , and choose the best model, which 
is the one that produces the largest likelihood. We define this model as our benchmark 
model. 
More concretely, we vary the values of 2q  from 1.0 to 2.5 by 0.01 and vary the values 
of 1q−2q  from 0.0 to 2.5 by 0.01 respectively, and calculate the log likelihood for each 
case. It turns out that the pair 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q  yields the largest log 
likelihood of 384.21. Table 2 reports the estimation results of this benchmark model. 
[Table 2 around here] 
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3.2.2. J-Tests 
To select the best estimated model with two thresholds, we use Davidson and 
Mackinnon’s (1981) non-nested testing procedure based on J-Tests. The model selection 
procedure proceeds as follows. Suppose that we wish to test the above benchmark 
model B, with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q , against an alternative model A with A11 qq =  
and A22 qq = , where A1q  and A2q  are exogenously given values. We first estimate the 
alternative model A with A11 qq =  and A22 qq =  in equation (3-3), and obtain the 
predicted values of ity , which we denote by Aityˆ . Superscript A indicates model A. In 
the second step, we add these predicted values Aityˆ  to the right-hand side of the 
benchmark model B, in which 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q , and apply an artificial 
regression to the resulting equation. We are interested in the significance of the 
coefficient estimate of the predicted values Aityˆ . If it is statistically significant, the 
implication is that the alternative model A has some additional information that our 
benchmark model B does not have. Otherwise, model A adds no information to our 
benchmark model B. Table 3 reports the results of these tests. Because none of the 
t-values indicates significance, all alternative models have no additional information. 
(All t-statistics reported in the paper are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors.) 
[Table 3 around here] 
We then switch the respective roles of models A and B, and test the significance of the 
coefficient estimate of the predicted values Bityˆ  in another artificial regression model 
with A11 qq =  and A22 qq = . If it is significant, our benchmark model has some 
additional information that model A does not have. Otherwise, the benchmark model 
adds no information to model A. Table 4 reports the results of these tests. We reject the 
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null hypothesis that our benchmark model has no additional information at least at 
the 10% significance level in 77 out of 83 cases. We cannot reject the null hypothesis in 
only six cases. The respective values of 1q  and 2q  in these six alternative models 
cluster around 0.91 and 1.2 in our benchmark model. This suggests that these six 
alternative models are so similar to our benchmark model that the tests are not 
sufficiently powerful to discriminate between them. 
[Table 4 around here] 
In summary, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that an alternative model has no 
additional information in all the 83 cases reported in Table 3. In Table 4, we reject the 
null hypothesis that our benchmark model has no additional information at least at 
the 10% significance level in 77 cases. These results imply that our benchmark model 
dominates these 77 alternative models. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that our 
benchmark model has no additional information in six cases in Table 4. However, the 
respective values of 1q  and 2q  in these six alternative models are so close to those in 
our benchmark model that our tests do not have sufficient power to discriminate 
between them. These results indicate that our benchmark model is the best model 
among those non-linear models with two thresholds. 
3.3. Linear Models and Models with One Threshold 
In the previous sub-section we found that our benchmark model is the best model 
among those models with two thresholds. In this sub-section we compare our 
benchmark model with linear models and with non-linear models with one threshold. 
For this, we use both standard F-tests and J-tests. 
3.3.1. F-Tests 
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We have found that model (3-3) with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q  is the best model among 
models with two thresholds. To compare this model with the equivalent model with one 
threshold, we use a standard F-test to test the null hypothesis that 2111 ββ =  in model 
(3-3) with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q .  
Substituting 2111 ββ =  into equation (3-3) yields the restricted model: 
( ) itit1it21it1it31itit1130 uDLγLγMβJGββ +⋅+++++= −−ity .                (3-4) 
We estimate (3-3) with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q , estimate (3-4) with 20.1=2q , and 
then calculate the F-value, which turns out to be 6.24. Under the null hypothesis, this 
statistic has an F-distribution with (1, 1418) degrees of freedom. We reject the null 
hypothesis that 2111 ββ =  at the 5% significance level. Therefore, we reject the model 
with one threshold. 
Similarly, we compare our best model with two thresholds with a linear model, and test 
the null hypothesis that 312111 βββ == . Substituting these two restrictions into equation 
(3-3) yields the restricted equation: 
( ) itit1it21it1ititit3130 uDLγLγMJGββ +⋅+++++= −−ity .                 (3-5) 
Having estimated (3-3) with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q , and (3-5), we test the null 
hypothesis that 312111 βββ == . The F-value turns out to be 7.48. This statistic has 
F-distribution with (2, 1418) degrees of freedom under the null. We reject the null 
hypothesis at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we reject the linear model. 
3.3.2. Non-nested J-Tests 
In sub-section 3.3.1, we confined our attention to model (3-3) with 91.0=1q  and 
20.1=2q , and tested restrictions on the coefficients in this model. In this sub-section, 
we first search for the best model among those with one threshold. Then, we compare 
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this model with the best model with two thresholds, which we validated in sub-section 
3.2. 
The procedure used to search for the best model with one threshold is the same as that 
used to search for the best model with two thresholds. In the first step, we find the 
benchmark model based on the likelihood; i.e., we find the one-threshold mode with the 
largest likelihood. In the second step, we use grid methods to compare the best model 
with two thresholds with all alternative models with one threshold, including the 
benchmark model with one threshold. 
In the first step, we vary the value of the threshold 1q  from 0.0 to 2.5 by 0.01, and find 
that the model with 3411 .q =  gives the largest log likelihood of 381.8763. Our 
estimated benchmark model with 3411 .q =  is reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5 around here] 
In the second step, we vary the value of threshold 1q  from 0.5 to 2.4 by 0.1, which 
produces 20 alternative models with one threshold. We also include the benchmark 
model with one threshold (with 3411 .q = ) as another alternative model. Therefore, we 
compare the best model with two thresholds ( 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q ) with these 21 
alternative models with one threshold. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the 
non-nested J-tests. 
[Tables 6 and 7 around here] 
The number in each cell in Table 6 is the t-value of the coefficient of the fitted variable 
A
ityˆ  in the corresponding alternative model with one threshold. Because none of these 
indicates statistical significance, the alternative models with one threshold have no 
additional information. 
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On the other hand, all the t-values in Table 7 indicate significance at least at the 5% 
level. This implies that the best model with two thresholds ( 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q ) 
has some additional information that is not incorporated in any of the alternative 
models. 
The exceptional case in Table 6 is that of 201.q1 = . In this case, the estimated 
coefficient of the fitted variable Aityˆ  is unusually large. We suggest that this is the 
result of multi-collinearity. Recall that our best model with two thresholds has 
91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q . 
The results of this section indicate that our best model with two thresholds ( 91.0=1q  
and 20.1=2q ) is the best model among linear models, models with one threshold, and 
models with two thresholds. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we summarise our findings and discuss their relationship to those of 
existing studies. 
4.1. Non-linearity 
We apply the neoclassical theory of investment that specifies investment as a function 
of Tobin’s q. With the introduction of non-convex adjustment costs into the model, Abel 
and Eberly (1994) show theoretically that the investment function incorporates an 
inactive portion in which investment does not respond to Tobin’s q. Although the 
consensus seems to be that the empirical literature supports this theory and the notion 
at investment is a non-linear function of Tobin’s q, there is no consensus about the type 
of non-linearity exhibited by the investment function. 
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For example, although Bo et al. (2006) rely on real-options theory and adopt a 
threshold variable that differs from Tobin’s q, they essentially estimate an investment 
function with one threshold. Based on our evidence the investment function is 
non-linear and sigmoidal with two thresholds. This empirical finding confirms those of 
Eberly (1997), Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), and Honda and Suzuki (2000). 
4.2. Irreversibility 
Our preferred estimated investment function is reported in Table 2. The estimate of 
the slope coefficient in the first regime, 11β , is 0.0134 and its t-value is 0.2362. This 
shows that the null hypothesis that the slope in the first regime is zero cannot be 
rejected. This suggests the existence of an inactive portion in which investment is 
insensitive to Tobin’s q, because of the irreversibility of investment. This finding 
confirms the theory of Abel and Eberly (1994), and is also consistent with the recent 
empirical findings of Chirinko and Schaller (2008), who estimate a Euler equation and 
obtain empirical evidence of an irreversibility premium. Our estimates also indicate 
that this inactive part holds for the domain q≦0.91. When Tobin’s q exceeds this 
threshold value of 0.91, the investment ratio starts to respond sharply to changes in 
Tobin’s q. 
What is the best estimate of the height of the investment ratio K/I  for the domain 
q≦0.91? The floor of the investment ratio in the first regime is given by: 
it1it21it1
1
0 DLγLγβ ⋅++ −− .                             (4-1) 
(See equation (2-1).) 
Substituting our preferred estimates from Table 2 with 91.0=1q  and 20.1=2q  into 
equation (3-2) yields our preferred estimate for 10β . Making use of this estimate of 10β  
together with the estimates of 1γ  and 2γ  from Table 2 enables us to estimate 
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equation (4-1) for each firm. We obtain such estimates for 104 firms. The simple 
average of equation (4-1) over these 104 firms turns out to be 0.1992. This represents 
the estimated depreciation rate δ  in Figure 7. 
4.3. Estimates of the Thresholds 
Our preferred estimate of the first threshold 1q  is 0.91. This implies that a firm starts 
to increase its investment ratio when Tobin’s q exceeds 0.91. This estimate 0.91 is 
smaller than those from existing studies. The corresponding benchmark estimates 
obtained by Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) are 1.95 for their first model and 1.13 for 
their second model. Honda and Suzuki (2000) report a corresponding benchmark 
estimate of 1.62. 
There are too few empirical studies to draw definitive conclusions on why these 
estimates differ. However, our estimates may differ from theirs for several reasons. 
First, unlike Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and Honda and Suzuki (2000), we control 
for the influence of financial constraints by adding the variables L and L ⋅ D to the 
right-hand side of equation (2-1). 
Second, our estimate of the first threshold applies to smaller unlisted firms whereas 
those of Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and Honda and Suzuki (2000) apply to larger 
listed firms. 
Third, our estimates are for Japanese firms whereas those of Barnett and Sakellaris 
(1998) are for US firms. More empirical evidence must be accumulated to explain 
estimation difference across different studies. 
4.4. Financial Constraints 
To control for the potential effects of financial constraints, we added 1it1Lγ −  and 
t1it2 DLγ ⋅−  to the right-hand side of equation (2-1). Our estimate of 1γ  is -0.1622 in 
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Table 2. The negative estimate implies that a firm with sufficient capital stock at the 
beginning of a period undertakes less investment in that period, as expected. The 
t-value of -10.2899 indicates that our estimate is highly significant. 
tD  in equation (2-1) is a dummy variable that is unity for firms that have never issued 
corporate bonds. Our estimate of 2γ  is 0.0588 in Table 2. This implies that the level of 
the capital stock is a rough indicator of ‘creditworthiness’, and that relatively large 
firms can borrow and invest more easily. The result is as expected. The t-value of 
2.3592 indicates that the parameter is highly significant. Our results support the 
notion that financial constraints matter and confirm those of in Honda and Suzuki 
(2006). 
4.5. Market Power 
Cooper and Ejarque (2001) argue that allowing the firm’s profit function to be strictly 
concave to reflect its market power is sufficient to replicate regression results based on 
q-theory in which profits significantly affect investment. Partially because of this 
argument, we have carefully selected our samples. More specifically, we have chosen to 
use data on auto parts suppliers. The sampled firms are small and unlisted. They are 
price takers and do not have the power to control their product prices. Therefore, the 
arguments of Cooper and Ejarque (2001) do not apply to our study. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Based on the investment theory developed by Abel and Eberly (1994), we have 
provided a simple analytical model of adjustment costs, which produces a sigmoidal 
investment function. We have also estimated the piecewise linear investment function, 
which includes the linear model, a model with one threshold, the original model of Abel 
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and Eberly (1994) with two thresholds, and the sigmoidal model as special cases. Our 
empirical evidence clearly supports the sigmoidal investment function. 
The sigmoidal investment function casts serious doubt on the credibility of existing 
large macro-econometric models that specify a linear investment function. 
Is it possible to aggregate sigmoidal investment functions over firms? If so, under what 
conditions? Although answering these questions is important for understanding the 
volatile nature of investment in practice, they are beyond the scope of our research. 
What is the threshold value of Tobin’s q above which a firm undertakes new 
investment? Our estimate is 0.91. Are these threshold values the same across 
industries and countries? Do they change over time? Answers to these questions 
require estimated thresholds for different samples, which is a task for future research. 
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Appendix 1.Derivation of the Standard Investment Function 
Following Abel (1980, 1990), we briefly derive the standard investment function in this 
appendix. A firm maximises its value V, which is the sum of future discounted net cash 
flows, with respect to capital investment I and other variable inputs, such as labour 
input, X. To simplify the exposition, we ignore taxes, which can easily be incorporated 
if necessary. 
( ) ( ){ }[ ] ( )dss,tRIpXwK,ICX,KFpV
t sisss1sss1sst
   ∫∞ −− −−−= ,               (A-1) 
where ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛−= ∫st vdvrexps,tR . 
sK , sX , sI , sp , sw , isp , ( )s1s X,KF − , ( )s,tR , and vr  denote the capital stock at the 
end of period s, variable input in period s, investment input in period s, the product 
price in period s, the variable input price in period s, the investment goods price in 
period s, a homogeneous production function of degree one, the discount factor that 
discounts the net cash flow of period s to their value at time t, and the discount rate at 
time v, respectively. ( )1ss K,IC −  is the adjustment cost incurred when a firm changes 
its capital stock K. C is assumed to be strictly convex with respect to I, and 
homogeneous of degree one with respect to I and K. 
  C represents the standard convex adjustment cost function. A firm maximises its 
value tV , given by (A-1), subject to the dynamic constraint, 
  1ttt KδIK −−=& ,                                                   (A-2) 
where ⋅  denotes the derivate with respect to time. 
The current value Hamiltonian of this maximisation problem is given by: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )1ttttittt1ttt1ttt KδIqIpXwK,ICX,KFpH −−− −+−−−= ,            (A-3) 
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where tq  is the shadow price of capital. The above maximisation problem yields the 
first-order condition: 
( ) ttt1tttit p/qI/K,ICp/p =∂∂+ − .                                    (A-4) 
The shadow price tq  can be shown to be the sum of the discounted values of marginal 
profits that accrue from an additional unit of capital installed at time t; see Abel (1980, 
1990) for details. 
When we assume a quadratic adjustment cost function: 
( ) 1t
2
1t
t
1tt KδK
I
2
αK,IC −
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= ,                                     (A-5) 
we have: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=∂∂
−
δ
K
I
αI/C
1t
t
tt .                                            (A-6) 
By substituting (A-6) into (A-4), we can derive the investment ratio K/I  as a linear 
function of q: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+=
−
1
p
q
p
p
α
1
δ
K
I
it
t
t
it
1t
t .                                           (A-7) 
This is the standard investment equation on which empirical studies are based. 
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Appendix 2.Data 
We describe data in this appendix. Because our sample comprises unlisted firms, stock 
price data are not available. Hence, we obtain our data from the financial statements 
of unlisted firms. 
A2.1. Data Sources 
The sample data are selected from the financial statements of 104 unlisted 
corporations that produce automobile parts. These data are complied by Tokyo Shoko 
Research (TSR). The Kaisha-Sokan (Corporation List) is used to identify automobile 
parts suppliers. Although we attempted to include all suppliers, the TSR database does 
not cover all firms. Our final sample comprises information on 104 corporations. 
The potential sample period is from 1977 to 2006, or 30 years. However, because few 
firms are represented for the entire sample period, we use an unbalanced panel. The 
total number of observations is 1,553. We discard as outliers cases with negative 
values of 1tq − . We also discard those samples for which any value of the gross profit 
rate, 1tq − , or K/I  is more than five standard deviations from the corresponding mean 
(see, e.g., Abel and Eberly (2002) for similar treatment of the data). Therefore, our final 
number of observations is 1,527. 
The fact that most of our sample consists of data with missing observations hampers 
use of the perpetual inventory method as used by Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) and 
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), and poses difficulties in measuring the replacement cost of 
capital, which is needed to measure marginal q. Hence, we follow Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), Polk and Sapienza (2008), Almeida and Campello (2007) and others, and use 
the book value of the nominal capital stock or total assets. 
A2.2.Tobin’s q 
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We define the gross profit rate as: 
( )
1
1
K
Kδπτ1
−
−+− ,                                        (A-8) 
where τ , π , δ , and 1K−  denote the corporate tax rate, operating profit, the 
depreciation rate, and capital stock at the beginning of the period, respectively. When 
we discount this value (A-8) by the cost of capital ( ) δrτ1 +−  with the assumption of 
static expectations, we have Tobin’s q, 1K/Vq −= , where ( )( ) δrτ1
Kδπτ1V 1+−
+−= −  and r 
denotes the interest rate. We use the average loan rate of each firm for r. 
A2.3.Corporate Investment 
We use the same definition of corporate investment as in Honda and Suzuki (2006), 
which improves measuring investment used in existing studies, including that of 
Hayashi and Inoue (1991). Anyone can download this working paper, Honda and 
Suzuki (2006), from http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/local/e_HP/e_g_shiryo.html, 
School of Economics, Osaka University. 
 
Footnote 
* The authors thank Kazuo Ogawa for his advice on computational techniques. The 
first author also gratefully acknowledges financial support from Grant-in-Aid No. 
17203016 and the Global Center of Excellence Program at Osaka University, both 
sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics from 1,527 Observations 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
I/K  0.3192 0.2327 -0.1662 1.5964 
q 1.3914 0.4651 0.0328 4.0472 
L 14.5747 1.1266 10.7462 17.7081 
 
 
Table 2: Benchmark Estimates of the Model with Two Thresholds  
( 1.20q0.91q 21 ==   and  ) 
 
 Estimates 
3
0β  (intercept of the third regime) 
2.5645 
(11.0512) 
1
1β  (slope of the first regime) 
0.0134 
(0.2362) 
2
1β  (slope of the second regime) 
0.3598 
(4.9787) 
3β1  (slope of the third regime) 
0.0354 
(1.8413) 
1γ  (coefficient of L) 
-0.1622 
(-10.2899) 
2γ  (coefficient of L･D) 
0.0588 
(2.3592) 
 
The log likelihood of the estimated equation is 384.2105. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values. Throughout the paper, all reported t-values are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
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Table 3: Testing the Significance of Aityˆ  in the Benchmark Model 
 
2q  
1q  
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 
0.2 -0.01 -0.66 0.26 0.60 1.09 0.83 0.91 1.10 
0.3 -0.04 -0.43 0.25 0.60 1.08 0.83 0.90 1.09 
0.4 0.47 0.36 0.46 0.70 1.15 0.87 0.93 1.12 
0.5 0.85 0.85 0.69 0.83 1.24 0.94 1.00 1.17 
0.6 0.93 0.96 0.73 0.85 1.25 0.95 1.00 1.18 
0.7 0.38 0.27 0.43 0.68 1.13 0.85 0.92 1.10 
0.8 0.47 0.36 0.42 0.67 1.13 0.85 0.91 1.09 
0.91 0.49  0.35 0.64 1.11 0.84 0.91 1.09 
1.0  -0.49 0.30 0.63 1.11 0.86 0.93 1.12 
1.1  -0.41 0.32 0.67 1.15 0.90 0.98 1.16 
1.2   0.35 0.64 1.11 0.84 0.91 1.09 
 
Note: The number in each cell is the t-value for the coefficient of the fitted variable Aityˆ . 
Because none of these indicates statistical significance, the alternative models convey 
no additional information. 
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Table 4: Testing the Significance of Bityˆ  in the Alternative Model 
 
2q  
1q  
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 
0.2 3.87*** 2.90*** 2.31** 2.44** 2.43** 2.85*** 3.11*** 3.24*** 
0.3 3.82*** 2.68*** 2.19** 2.40** 2.41** 2.84*** 3.10*** 3.24*** 
0.4 3.67*** 2.31** 1.93** 2.28** 2.35** 2.81*** 3.08*** 3.23*** 
0.5 3.51*** 1.88* 1.70* 2.19** 2.31** 2.79*** 3.08*** 3.23*** 
0.6 3.40*** 1.51 1.57 2.16** 2.30** 2.80*** 3.09*** 3.25*** 
0.7 3.36*** 1.29 1.62* 2.23** 2.36** 2.83*** 3.11*** 3.26*** 
0.8 3.12*** 0.58 1.60 2.28** 2.41** 2.88*** 3.15*** 3.29*** 
0.91 2.73***  1.73* 2.37** 2.47** 2.91*** 3.16*** 3.29*** 
1.0  1.39 2.02** 2.49** 2.54** 2.93*** 3.15*** 3.25*** 
1.1  2.18** 2.40** 2.60*** 2.57*** 2.85*** 2.99*** 3.05*** 
1.2   2.64*** 2.70*** 2.64*** 2.80*** 2.86*** 2.89*** 
 
Note: The number in each cell is the t-value for the coefficient of the fitted variable Bityˆ .  
***”, **, and * indicate that the fitted variable Bityˆ  is significant at the 1% level, 5% level, 
and 10% level, respectively, which implies that the benchmark model conveys more 
information than does each alternative model. 
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Table 5: Benchmark Estimates of the Model with One Threshold 
   ( 1.34q1 = ) 
 Estimates 
2
0β  (intercept of the third regime) 
2.5797 
(11.0218) 
1
1β  (slope of the first regime) 
0.1742 
(5.6493) 
2
1β  (slope of the second regime) 
0.0313 
(1.5338) 
1γ  (coefficient of L) 
-0.1627 
(-10.1861) 
2γ  (coefficient of L･D) 
0.0577 
(2.3046) 
 
The log likelihood of the estimated equation is 381.8763. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-values. 
 
Table 6: Testing the Significance of Aityˆ  (the Fitted Values from the Model with One 
Threshold) in the Best Model with Two Thresholds  
 
1q  0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.34 1.4 
t-value 0.85 0.96 -0.27 -0.36 0.22 0.49 0.41 - 0.35 0.39 0.35
 
1q  1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
t-value 0.49 0.64 1.03 1.11 0.94 0.84 0.78 0.91 1.01 1.09 
 
Note: The number in each cell is the t-value for the coefficient of the fitted variable Aityˆ  
in an alternative model with one threshold. Because none indicates statistical 
significance, alternative models with one threshold convey no additional information. 
33 
 
Table 7: Testing the Significance of Bityˆ  (the Fitted Values from the Model with Two 
Thresholds) in Alternative Models with One Threshold  
 
1q  0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.34 1.4 
t-value 4.12*** 4.13*** 4.10*** 4.09*** 4.05*** 3.91*** 3.52*** 3.14*** 2.67*** 2.53** 2.49**
 
1q  1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
t-value 2.45** 2.51** 2.40** 2.47** 2.67*** 2.86*** 3.04*** 3.11*** 3.19*** 3.24*** 
 
Note: Number in each cell is the t-value for the coefficient of the fitted variable Bityˆ . ***, 
**, and * indicate that the fitted variable Bityˆ  is significant at the 1% level, 5% level, 
and 10% level, respectively, which implies that the best model with two thresholds 
( 20.1q91.0q 21 ==   and  ) conveys additional information not conveyed by each 
alternative model. 
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Figures 
Fig. 1.TheIrreversibility of Investment in Abel and Eberly (1994)  
 
 
Fig. 2.Linear Adjustment Costs in Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) 
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Fig. 3.Asymmetric Adjustment Costs 
  
 
 
Fig. 4.An Alternative Specification of Irreversibility 
 
0 
G 
0 q 
δ
δ
K
I
K
I
36 
 
Fig. 5.A Horizontal First Part  
 
 
Fig. 6.Prohibitive Adjustment Costs for Extremely Large Investments 
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Fig. 7.A Non-linear Investment Function with Two Kinks 
 
 
Fig. 8.A Model with Two Thresholds  
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Fig. 9.Sample Plot of Investment Ratio against Lagged Tobin’s q (N=1,527) 
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